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1. Introduction 
 
The Citizenship Act of Japan applies primarily ius sanguinis (the bloodline principle), and ius 
soli (the territorial principle) is limited to the case of children born in Japan whose parents are 
unknown. The rule emphasising descent rather than birthplace appears to fit well with the 
image of the ethnically exclusive nature of contemporary Japanese society (Kashiwazaki: 
1998, 278). Foreign nationals of the second and third generation are required to apply for 
naturalisation.  Besides ‘general residence-based’ naturalisation, some European states have 
established a ‘socialisation-based’ notification system for young foreigners, on the condition 
of a certain period of domicile or education in their settled states (Waldrauch: 2006). There is 
no such notification system based on ius domicilii (the principle of residence) for the second 
generation immigrants in Japan. The notification process is limited to the cases of 1) 
acknowledged children and 2) reacquisition of citizenship for foreign-born children who did 
not reserve their Japanese citizenship. The five-year residence requirement for naturalisation 
set forth in the Citizenship Act of Japan is not particularly strict, but multiple citizenship is 
not recognised. Consequently, the naturalisation rate of Japan, at 0.4 percent of the foreign 
population in 2013, is extremely low among OECD countries (OECD: 2015, 350). The 
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which is an international comparative research 
instrument measuring policies to integrate migrants in 28 EU Member States, Australia, 
Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the 
USA, shows the relatively low evaluation of Japan’s policy on access to nationality. Japan is 
placed 23rd out of 38 countries (MIPEX: 2015).2 
This report will analyse the acquisition and loss of citizenship in Japan and discuss 
multiple citizenship and statelessness. Japan has three special features comprising (i) the 
‘system of reservation’ for children born abroad, (ii) the ‘system of option’ for dual citizens, 
and (iii) the ‘system of special permanent residents’ for former colonial persons and their 
descendants. After first explaining the history of Japanese nationality legislation, I will 
discuss the acquisition of citizenship and the prevention of discrimination in acquiring 
Japanese citizenship.  Then, I will examine the loss of citizenship and the prohibition of 
arbitrary deprivation of citizenship. The last part of this report will focus on the influence of 
international human rights laws as regards the prevention of discrimination and arbitrary 
deprivation of citizenship.  
                                                        
1 This report is a more extensive version of A. Kondo, ‘Citizenship in Japan and the Influence of International 
Human Rights Law’, in Liber Amicorum Prof. Gerard-René de Groot, (eds.) Olivier Vonk et.al., Deventer: 
Kluwer, 2016, p. 229-239.  
2 As for Japan in the MIPEX 2010, see Kondo and Yamawaki (2014). 
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2. Nationality Legislation in Historical Perspective 
 
It is generally agreed in Japan that the modern concept of nationality as membership of a State 
was established after the creation of Imperial Japan in 1868 (Hosokawa: 1990, 190). Until 
then, Japan was not a modern nation state, and was comprised of a loose confederation of 
feudal domains (Wetherall: 2006, 14). It should be noted that the regime of the Tokugawa 
Shogunate (the last feudal military government in Japan) had a policy of seclusion from 1639 
to 1853. The Shogunate suspected that Catholic traders and missionaries were forerunners of 
a military conquest by European powers and prohibited both nationals and non-nationals from 
entering or leaving the country, with the exception of trade relations with China and the 
Netherlands in the port of Nagasaki (Kondo: 2015, 156). Thus, the Meiji Government 
considered that the population of Japan at that time consisted almost entirely of ethnic 
Japanese who were born and had been residing in Japan for several generations, and that such 
people became nationals under the new regime  (Hosokawa: 1990, 191). Almost all 
inhabitants of Japan were treated as Japanese nationals and registered as such in the family 
registration.3 
The 1871 Family Registration Act (Edict No. 170) was the first nationwide family 
registration law, which is related to the abolition of feudal domains and served as an 
important tool for fostering national unity (Kashiwazaki: 1998. 285). Unlike in many other 
nations, citizenship in Japan is traditionally based not on the idea of citizenship of the 
individual, but rather of the family (Lecea: 2010, 26). In most developed states the basic unit 
in the registry is the individual, but Japan uses the unit of the administrative household 
(family registration). Under the Preamble of the 1871 Family Registration Act, ‘those who are 
not registered or not counted cannot receive government protection and are as if placed 
outside the nation. Because of this, the people must be listed in the family registration’. 
Article 170 of the 1898 Family Registration Act stipulated that ‘a person who does not 
possess Japanese nationality cannot establish a location of family registration’ (Krogness: 
2014, 147-8). Therefore, the family registration had a function of determination who were 
Japanese nationals.  
The first law dealing with nationality in Japan was the International Marriage 
Proclamation of the Great Council of State (Edict No. 103) of 1873. This was not a 
comprehensive law, but simply prescribed the effect of marriage and nationality. The 
Proclamation provided that the international marriages had to be permitted by the government 
and that a foreign woman who became the wife of a Japanese man would automatically 
become a Japanese national. A Japanese woman who became the wife of a foreign man would 
lose her Japanese nationality if she acquired her husband’s nationality, securing the 
uniformity of nationality in a family. The Proclamation made no provision for expatriation. 
Thus, a Japanese national did not lose Japanese nationality even if he or she had acquired a 
foreign nationality by naturalisation (Hosokawa: 1990, 181-182). 
          The 1899 Nationality Act was the first comprehensive law dealing with nationality. 
This Act was based on the principle of ius sanguinis a patre which gives priority to the male 
line of descent with respect to the acquisition of Japanese nationality by birth. However, for 
the purpose of reducing cases of statelessness among children born in Japan, the Act was 
                                                        
3 Family registration included communities such as the indigenous Ainu and Okinawan populations, the 
members of former outcast communities and the early settlers of Ogasawara Islands who were originally from 
the Pacific, America and Europe. However, Karafuto (Sakhalin) was treated differently; especially the 
indigenous Orok and Nivkh populations were not registered. Foreigners (born abroad and not registered) could 
be registered under the conditions of the International Marriage Proclamation of 1873 (Chapman: 2014, 94-5). 
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supplemented by elements of ius soli, stating that ‘a child shall be a Japanese national if born 
in Japan and both of the parents are unknown or are without nationality’ (Article 4). The 
principle of  ius sanguinis was a logical choice in the late 19th century in Japan because it was 
compatible with the previous legal practices of the family registration system to define the 
subject population and because many legal advisers to the Japanese government came from 
continental European countries such as Germany and France (Kashiwazaki: 2000, 438; 
Kashiwazaki: 1998, 283, 289).    
The 1899 Nationality Act was revised in 1916, adding provisions for renunciation by 
dual nationals who are domiciled in the country of their foreign nationality, for the purpose of 
coping with difficulties caused by anti-Japanese sentiment in North and South American 
countries, especially in the United States. However, a Japanese subject of 17 or more years of 
age could not divest himself of Japanese nationality unless he performed his military service 
or was exempt therefrom (Scott: 1916, 367). 
It should be added that the renunciation procedure for dual nationals was followed in 
1924 by a reform introducing the ‘system of reservation’ for children born in designated ius 
soli states. The 1924 Imperial Ordinance designated Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Peru 
and the USA, and Mexico was added by the 1926 Imperial Ordinance. Children born in these 
states needed to show the will to reserve (i.e., retain) their Japanese nationality within two 
weeks of their birth, otherwise they could not retain it.  
Something else to be borne in mind here is that Imperial Japan acquired Taiwan in 1895 
after the Sino-Japanese War, and the southern part of Sakhalin in 1905 after the Russo-
Japanese War. The 1899 Nationality Act was declared applicable to Taiwan by Imperial 
Ordinance (Edict No. 289) of 1899 and to Sakhalin by Imperial Ordinance (Edict No. 88) of 
1924, but was never applied to Korea which was annexed by Imperial Japan in 1910. Due to 
the Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty, local residents in Korea were deemed to have become 
Japanese subjects. Acquisition and loss of the status of Japanese subject was subsequently 
determined by customary law, which did not allow for renunciation of the status. The major 
reason for this was that the 1899 Nationality Act made it clear that Japanese subjects who 
took up a foreign nationality would lose their Japanese nationality; its application to Korea 
would have made it all too easy for Korean emigrants to China (primarily to Manchuria4) to 
be naturalised to Chinese, or later Manchukuo, citizens. Rural poverty in Korea prompted a 
massive flow of landless farmers from Korea into Manchuria. By 1942 the number of Koreans 
in Manchuria had reached about 1.5 million. For these migrants, the difficulties of adjusting to 
a new life in a harsh environment were aggravated by their uncertain nationality status. In 
many cases, they faced discrimination from Chinese authorities because they were ‘aliens’. 
(Morris-Suzuki: 2008, 16-7). 
     Under the new Constitution after World War II, a new Citizenship Act was enacted 
in 1950. This Act deregulated the renunciation of Japanese citizenship by simple declaration, 
removed restrictions on the rights of a naturalised person, and abolished the automatic change 
of citizenship after international marriage etc. The 1950 Citizenship Act was reformed in 
1952 and the naturalisation authority was transferred from the Attorney General to the 
Minister of Justice.5 Major reforms were the 1984 Amendment, transforming the principle 
from ius sanguinis a patre to ius sanguinis a patre et a matre; and the 2008 Amendment, 
                                                        
4 Manchuria is located in northeast China. Under Japanese control it was declared an ‘independent state’, and the 
Japanese appointed the dethroned Qing emperor Puyi as puppet emperor of Manchukuo from 1931 to 1945. 
However, the Nationality Act did not establish in Manchukuo. There were many Chinese and some Japanese, 
Korean and Russian residents. 
5 Under the 1947 Amendment Act for the 1899 Nationality Act, naturalisation authority was transferred from the 
Home Affairs Minister to the competent minister and then to the Attorney General. 
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removing the requirement of marriage of parents in Article 3 for the acquisition of citizenship 
through legitimation after birth because of a decision of the Supreme Court (see below section 
3). Minor technical reforms concerned the 1993 Amendment caused by enforcing the 
Administrative Procedure Act,6 the 2004 Amendment caused by the reform of the Civil Act 
for using modern Japanese notation, and the 2014 Amendment, adding Article 18 bis for the 
exclusion from application of the Administrative Procedure Act.7 
 
 
3. Acquisition of Citizenship and Preventing Discrimination 
 
 
3.1.  The 1899 Nationality Act and the 1950 Citizenship Act  
Nationality is a matter of the sovereignty of each state and the legislative body has a wide 
discretion over state membership. However, legislative discretion has been shrinking due to 
the development of human rights law. Article 18 of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan 
(1889) stipulated that ‘the conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject shall be 
determined by law’. The former Nationality Act (1899) adopted the principle of ius sanguinis 
a patre, presupposing the principle that the nationality of a married woman follows that of her 
husband. This principle of ‘dependent nationality’ was justified by the traditional conceptions 
of family structure and male pre-eminence. It was abandoned in the revised Citizenship Act8 
(1950) in accordance with the new Constitution. Article 14(1)9 of the Constitution of Japan 
(1947) prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex and other attributes by declaring the 
equality of the people under the law, and Article 24(2) guarantees individual dignity and the 
essential equality of the sexes especially with respect to family life.  These articles of the 
Constitution stand in contradiction to the principle of ius sanguinis a patre (Yamada: 1981, 
20). However, this principle was left untouched,10 mainly for the purpose of preventing dual 
citizenship at birth (Yokomizo: 2014, 988-9).  
                                                        
6 The Administrative Procedure Act was applicable only to Article 16(3) of the Citizenship Act, requiring that 
the proceedings on the date of the hearing pertaining to the pronouncement of judgment of loss of Japanese 
citizenship shall be conducted open to the public. It should be noted that the Administrative Procedure Act has 
not been applicable to naturalisation procedures. 
7 Article 18 bis stipulates that ‘in cases of written notice under Article 15(1), Article 36(3) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (Act No. 88 of 1993) shall not be applied’. Article 36(3) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
provides that every person can ask to the competent Administrative Organs to impose Administrative 
Disposition and render Administrative Guidance if there is the fact of illegality. Therefore, no one can ask to 
provide the written notice to the Minister of Justice if a dual citizen does not select citizenship within the 
specified period. 
8 The Japanese term ‘Kokuseki Ho (Nationality Act)’ remains unchanged, however, as sovereignty has been 
transferred from the Emperor to the people under the present Constitution, I will use the term Citizenship Act for 
the post-war law. However, the official translation uses the term Nationality Act. An English translation is 
available at: 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=&ia=03&x=9&y=17&al
[]=N&ky=&page=4&vm=02 (accessed 10 September 2016).  
9 ‘All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social 
relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin’. 
10 In addition, the Horei (law concerning the application of laws), which in determining the governing law 
regarding marriage and parental relationships gives priority to the citizenship of a husband and a father over a 
wife and a mother, has not been reformed. See Torii (1978, 104). The Horei abolished the husband’s nationality 
principle in 1989 and was reformed by the Act on General Rules for Application of Laws in 2006. 
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Article 10 of the new Constitution provides that ‘the conditions necessary for being a 
Japanese national shall be determined by law’, with the exception of Article 22(2), stipulating 
that the ‘freedom of all persons … to divest themselves of their nationality shall be inviolate’. 
Article 22(2) of the new constitution is similar to freedom of any person from being 
‘arbitrarily deprived of his nationality’ and ‘the right to change his nationality’ under Article 
15(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 10 of the new Constitution is 
almost identical to Article 18 of the old Constitution. However, the concept of human rights in 
the new Constitution is quite different from the rights of subjects laid down in the former 
Constitution. Human rights are inalienable and universal rights. Article 98(2) of the new 
Constitution stipulates that ‘treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall 
be faithfully observed’. This article expresses the basic characteristics of Japan’s approach to 
international relations, which is international cooperation and pursuit of world peace. 
Recently, the pro homine principle has been pointed out under Article 11 of the Constitution, 
stating that ‘the people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human 
rights’ (de Oliveira Mazzuoli and Ribeiro: 2015, 253, 270). Fundamental human rights are not 
only constitutional rights but also international human rights. According to the pro homine 
principle, human rights instruments must seek the best possible protection for the human 
person regardless of whether the rights concerned are national or international human rights. 
 
3.2. Ius Sanguinis and Gender Equality 
 
In 1979, when the Diet (Japan’s bicameral legislature) considered the ratification of the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC), Foreign Minister Sonoda 
admitted that the principle of ius sanguinis a patre discriminated against women, although 
officials of the Ministry of Justice maintained that it did not contravene the principle of 
gender equality stipulated in the covenants (Iwasawa: 1997, 273). In the early 1980s, a 
number of Japanese women married to American men initiated lawsuits, requesting the courts 
to confirm that their children had Japanese citizenship, otherwise they would be left stateless 
because their fathers had not been residents in American territory for ten consecutive years – a 
condition for inheriting American citizenship.11 The Tokyo District Court decided that the 
Citizenship Act was not contrary to constitutional gender equality because the principle of ius 
sanguinis a patre was reasonable for avoiding dual citizenship and was complemented by the 
facilitated naturalisation system for children of Japanese citizens living in Japan for three 
consecutive years.12 The Tokyo High Court’s final decision declared that the Diet had the 
authority to correct the defect of the Citizenship Act, and it was not within the court’s 
power.13  Compared to the German Federal Constitutional Court, which considered the 
Nationality Act based on a paternal lineage standard to be unconstitutional for reason of 
contravening gender equality principles,14 Japanese courts were reluctant to decide on the 
law’s unconstitutionality. While the German Federal Constitutional Court decided in 1974 
that multiple citizenship was an ‘evil’,15 in 1998 the German Federal Administrative Court 
pointed out that ‘rules prohibiting multiple citizenship have been eroding in many 
                                                        
11 In addition, when an American soldier deserted his Japanese family, children often became stateless. When a 
Japanese woman who had unsuccessfully tried to divorce an American who had deserted her had a child with a 
Japanese man out of wedlock, this child could become stateless. See Abe (2010), 34. 
12 Tokyo District Court, 437 Hanrei Times 75 (30 March 1981). 
13 Tokyo High Court, 470 Hanrei Times 90 (23 June 1982). 
14 BVerfGE 37, 217 (21 May 1974).  
15 Ibid. 
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countries’.16 In Japan, by contrast, the Tokyo District Court noted the ‘evil of multiple 
citizenship’ in 1981,17 the Osaka High Court ruled in 1998 that it was ‘ideal to avoid’ the 
emergence of multiple citizenship as much as possible,18 and the Supreme Court, as recently 
as in 2015, underscored the ‘harmful effects of multiple citizenship on the domestic legal 
order’.19 
      In 1985, Japan ratified the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Article 9(2) CEDAW states that ‘States Parties 
shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children’, and 
created the need for citizenship reforms, from paternal to both maternal and paternal lineages. 
Before ratifying the convention, the Diet amended the Citizenship Act in 1984. However, the 
Diet established the unique ‘system of option’ based on the principle of avoiding dual 
citizenship even in the case of a child born from an international marriage.  Under the new 
Article 14 of the Citizenship Act, Japanese citizens having foreign citizenship must select one 
of the nationalities before their twenty-second birthday, or within two years of acquiring the 
foreign nationality, whichever occurs later.20 It should be noted that this situation constitutes 
different treatment between citizens21. 
However, the obligation to choose one nationality is not a strict one. Under Article 
16, ‘Japanese citizens who make a declaration of choice shall endeavour to renounce their 
foreign citizenship’. Indeed, while the Minister of Justice may provide written notice on this 
renunciation duty (Article 15), there has been no practice of actually doing so. Those who 
oppose multiple citizenship in Japan raise loyalty conflicts, clashes in rights of diplomatic 
protection, and problems related to personal statuses such as bigamy, as arguments. However, 
one Director-General of the Civil Affairs Bureau acknowledged that ‘there is no precedent of 
actual problems having been caused by multiple citizenship’.22 
 
3.3. Acknowledged Illegitimate Children 
 
Under the revised Article 2(1) of the Citizenship Act, Japanese citizenship by birth is acquired 
from the citizenship of either Japanese parent. However, Article 3 of the Citizenship Act 
formerly denied citizenship to children born out of wedlock and acknowledged by the 
Japanese father after birth based on the requirement of (i) acknowledgment before birth or (ii) 
marriage of the parents after birth. In 2008, the Supreme Court declared Article 3 of the 
                                                        
16 BVerwG 107, 223 (29 September 1998). 
17 Tokyo District Court, 437 Hanrei Times 75 (30 March 1981). 
18 The Osaka High Court decided that refusing Japanese citizenship to an illegitimate child, even where the child 
was acknowledged by the parent after birth, did not constitute unreasonable discrimination, as prohibited in 
Article 14 of the Constitution. 992 Hanrei Times 103 (25 September 1999). 
19 Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, 10 Mar. 2015, 69:2 Minshu 265. An English translation is available at: 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1348 (accessed 30 September 2016). 
20 Article 14 is modelled on the resolution which was adopted in 1977 by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe. However, this resolution was only followed by Italy which then abolished the provision on 
the selection of nationality in 1992 (Okuda: 2003, 101). 
21 Germany tolerates dual citizenship iure sanguinis, but adopted a requirement to renounce a foreign citizenship 
acquired at birth before the age of 23 for citizens iure soli when ius soli was introduced in 1999. Since 2015 this 
‘option duty’ for ius soli children no longer applies to those who have resided for 8 years in Germany or have 
attended public education there. It can be argued that this option duty is in fact discriminatory. Article 17(1) of 
the European Convention on Nationality stipulates that ‘nationals of a State Party in possession of another 
nationality shall have, in the territory of that State Party in which they reside, the same rights and duties as other 
nationals of that State Party’. 
22 Seiichi Fusamura at the House of Representatives Committee on Judicial Affairs (2 June 2004). 
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Citizenship Act to be unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of Article 14(1), in a 
case where a child was born in Japan to a Japanese father and a Philippine mother who were 
not married and the child had been acknowledged by the father after birth. The Court 
mentioned the fact that Japan had ratified the ICCPR and the 1989 Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC) prohibiting discrimination of any kind because of birth and also the fact 
that many states that had previously required legitimation for granting citizenship to children 
born out of wedlock to fathers who are their citizens had revised their laws in order to grant 
citizenship without any other requirement if it was found that the father-child relationship 
with their citizens was established as a result of acknowledgement.23 This decision criticised, 
for example, that ‘the CRC should be construed as prohibiting discrimination against 
illegitimate children under nationality law, and could therefore have been directly referred to 
as the human rights basis for the limitation upon the legislative discretion’ (Okuda and Nasu: 
2008, 111; Okuda, 2005, 40-41). Eventually, following the court decision the Diet amended 
the article, admitting citizenship after birth through notification to the Minister of Justice.24 
 
3.4. Naturalisation 
 
Under Article 5 of the Citizenship Act, the Minister of Justice may permit naturalisation under 
certain conditions: (i) having had domicile in Japan for at least five consecutive years; 25 (ii) 
being at least twenty years of age; (iii) being a person of good conduct; (iv) being able to 
make a living through one’s assets or abilities, or those of a spouse or relative; (v) not having 
the citizenship of another country, or renouncing one’s citizenship due to the acquisition of 
Japanese citizenship; and (vi) not having planned or advocated the destruction of the 
Constitution or the Government of Japan.26 In practice, knowledge of the Japanese language 
at the level of a third year elementary school pupil (age eight to nine) is necessary, but there is 
no civic knowledge or assimilation requirement.  The low naturalisation rate, therefore, 
mainly stems from the principle of avoiding dual citizenship. If foreign residents were 
allowed to keep their original citizenship, many would be willing to apply for naturalisation.  
Historically, the naturalisation procedure included assimilationist requirements. 
Assessment of assimilation into the Japanese lifestyle was required under the old 
administrative guidance on naturalisation (Kondo: 2000, 126).  Many Koreans refuse 
naturalisation, despite long term residence in Japan, because they do not want to lose their 
ethnic identity, which is connected to their citizenship. It should be added that they have not 
forgotten the history of Japanese colonisation when they were forced to take Japanese 
nationality and Japanese names (Kondo: 2001, 13). In 1959, the large number of denied 
applications (3,020) was almost the same as the number of approvals (3,076). These 
phenomena show that the Japanese government was strictly screening those who were 
qualified to be Japanese and those who were not (Lee: 2005, 43). Following the amendment 
of the Citizenship Act in 1984, the phrase ‘Japanese name only’ in the administrative 
                                                        
23  Supreme Court, Grand Chamber, 4 June 2008, 62:6 Minshu 1367. English translation is available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=955 (accessed 30 September 2016). 
24 See Criteria Changes to Acquisition of Japanese Nationality. Available at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000001921.pdf (accessed 30 September 2016). 
25 Under Article 7, spouses of citizens can apply for naturalisation after three years’ residence (or one year of 
residence if the marriage has existed for more than three years). Under Article 8, stateless persons born in Japan 
can apply for naturalisation after three years’ residence, adopted children of Japanese citizens can apply for 
naturalisation after one-year’s residence, and children of Japanese citizens or persons who have lost Japanese 
citizenship can apply at any time if they have domicile in Japan. 
26 Conditions (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) have been in effect since 1899, and condition (vi) has been in force since 1950. 
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guidelines on naturalisation was eliminated.27 Howeversome officials continued to give an 
advice to use Japanese name for avoiding discrimination and it is still necessary to write the 
name with Japanese characters (kanjihiragana or katakana); some characters used in Korean 
names could not be translated into Japanese name characters (Kondo: 2002, 422). Since 9 July 
2012, only family names are deregulated and most Korean family names can be translated 
into Japanese family name kanjis. Besides official requirements, naturalisation applicants 
need to submit two documents asking whether the other family members are willing to 
naturalise or support the applicant’s decision and asking whether neighbours or colleagues 
know the applicant’s original citizenship (Lee: 2005, 46-47). These documents are 
problematic because of the right to self-determination and privacy.  
Table 1 shows the number of naturalisation applications, approvals and rejections. 
Since 1989, the ratio of rejections has been relatively small. This was caused by the pre-
application interviews between applicants and officials of the local legal affairs bureaus. If 
persons who were considering to apply for naturalisation but received a negative advice 
because of their failure to meet certain requirements, they usually decided not to apply. 
However, since 2012, the ratio of rejections is relatively large. With the introduction of the 
new Residence Card System on 9 July, 2012, naturalisation applicants are more strictly 
screened, for example as regards their pension premium payment records or the residence 
records of their spouses. Previously, this was done on a case by case basis only. 
 
Table 1 Numbers of Naturalisation Applicants, Permits and Rejects 
  Applications Approvals Rejections 
    Total Koreans Chinese Others   
Pre-1952 -  333  -  -  -  -  
1952-1966 - 46,932 41,151 4,320 1,461 - 
1967 - 4,150 3,391 589 170 - 
1968 - 3,501 3,194 114 193 - 
1969 5,372 2,153 1,889 124 140 - 
1970 5,663 5,379 4,646 320 413 - 
1971 6,784 3,386 2,874 249 263 - 
1972 12,417 6,825 4,983 1,303 539 - 
1973 11,436 13,629 5,769 7,338 522 - 
1974 9,728 7,393 3,973 3,026 394 - 
1975 9,080 8,568 6,323 1,641 604 - 
1976 8,325 5,605 3,951 1,323 331 - 
1977 8,628 5,680 4,261 1,113 306 - 
1978 8,440 7,391 5,362 1,620 409 - 
                                                        
27 The ‘Japanese name only’ guideline is thought to be in contradiction with Article 27 ICCPR which requires 
ratifying states to allow minorities in their societies to maintain their own ethnic or cultural identities. See Port: 
1991, 158. The Amendment Act and the Family Registration Act from 1984 (in force since January 1985) 
admitted foreign names for spouses and children born from mixed marriages. Persons who held Japanese 
citizenship, in turn, could now also have foreign names, and the presupposition that Japanese citizens should 
have Japanese names disappeared at the same time that naturalised citizens were allowed to have foreign names. 
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1979 9,786 6,458 4,701 1,402 355 - 
1980 9,158 8,004 5,987 1,619 398 - 
1981 9,168 8,823 6,829 1,572 422 - 
1982 9,126 8,494 6,521 1,542 431 - 
1983 8,463 7,435 5,532 1,560 343 - 
1984 8,034 6,169 4,608 1,183 378 - 
1985 7,930 6,824 5,040 1,434 350 - 
1986 7,664 6,636 5,110 1,304 222 - 
1987 7,587 6,222 4,882 1,131 209 - 
1988 7,523 5,767 4,595 990 182 - 
1989 8,702 6,089 4,759 1,066 264 399 
1990 9,904 6,794 5,216 1,349 229 274 
1991 10,373 7,788 5,665 1,818 305 223 
1992 11,479 9,363 7,244 1,794 325 162 
1993 12,706 10,452 7,697 2,244 511 126 
1994 12,278 11,146 8,244 2,478 424 146 
1995 12,346 14,104 10,327 3,184 593 93 
1996 14,944 14,495 9,898 3,976 621 97 
1997 16,164 15,061 9,678 4,729 654 90 
1998 17,486 14,779 9,561 4,637 581 108 
1999 17,067 16,120 10,059 5,335 726 202 
2000 14,936 15,812 9,842 5,245 725 215 
2001 13,442 15,291 10,295 4,377 619 130 
2002 13,344 14,339 9,188 4,442 709 107 
2003 15,666 17,633 11,778 4,722 1,133 150 
2004 16,790 16,336 11,031 4,122 1,183 148 
2005 14,666 15,251 9,689 4,427 1,135 166 
2006 15,340 14,108 8,531 4,347 1,230 255 
2007 16,107 14,680 8,546 4,740 1,394 260 
2008 15,440 13,218 7,412 4,322 1,484 269 
2009 14,878 14,785 7,637 5,392 1,756 201 
2010 13,391 13,072 6,668 4,816 1,588 234 
2011 11,008 10,359 5,656 3,259 1,444 279 
2012 9,940 10,622 5,581 3,598 1,443 457 
2013 10,119 8,646 4,331 2,845 1,470 332 
2014 11,377 9,277 4,744 3,060 1,473 509 
2015 12,442 9,469 5,247 2,813 1,409 603 
 
Source: Civil Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Justice (2016).  
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3.5. Statelessness 
 
Article 15(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) stipulates that ‘everyone 
has the right to a nationality, and Article 24(3) ICCPR and Article 7(1) CRC state that ‘every 
child has the right to acquire a nationality’. The right to a nationality can be interpreted as a 
positive formulation of the duty to avoid statelessness. Japan has not acceded to the 1954 
Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness. In the Committee on Judicial Affairs, House of Councillors, on 10 
May 1984, government delegate Taisuke Biwata explained that Articles 1(2)(a) and 1(2)(b) of 
the 1961 Convention are not compatible with the Citizenship Act (Arakaki: 2015, 29). 
According to resident registration data of 2015, there were 587 stateless persons in Japan. In 
addition, there are presumed to be a number of unregistered stateless persons who are 
irregular residents and some de facto stateless persons.28 Under Article 2(3) of the Citizenship 
Act, if born in Japan and both parents are unknown or are without citizenship, a child can 
acquire Japanese citizenship by virtue of ius soli due to the principle of avoiding statelessness. 
In the Andrew case, the Supreme Court granted Japanese citizenship to a child born in Japan 
whose father was unknown and mother missing, thereby expanding the interpretation of 
Article 2(3) of the Citizenship Act. The Article which stipulates ‘both of the parents are 
unknown’ was interpreted as, ‘both of the parents are not identified’ for the sake of avoiding 
statelessness.29 However, the Court did not admit the plaintiff’s argument that Article 24(3) 
ICCPR demands the principle avoiding statelessness but affirmed this principle in the purpose 
and objective of Article 2(3) of the Citizenship Act.  
 
 
4. Loss of Citizenship and the Prohibition of Arbitrary Deprivation of 
Citizenship 
 
4.1. Voluntary Renunciation  
 
Under the 1899 Nationality Act, renunciation of nationality was only possible by those who 
actively acquired a foreign nationality by naturalisation, but not those born with dual 
nationality. In 1916, the 1899 Nationality Act was amended, opening the way for overseas 
Japanese nationals born with dual nationality to renounce their Japanese nationality. However, 
loss of Japanese nationality was conditional on the granting of permission by the Minister of 
Interior, who had discretion to refuse permission on any ground. Therefore, second generation 
emigrants can renounce Japanese nationality, although adult males could only do so after 
completing compulsory military service. This was followed by a more fundamental reform in 
1924 through the introduction of the ‘system of reservation’, which made it necessary for 
children born in ius soli nations (specified as the USA, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile and 
Peru) to be registered with the Japanese consulate within two weeks of their birth if they were 
to retain Japanese nationality (Morris-Suzuki: 2008, 12). Thereafter, children born in the 
abovementioned countries could renounce Japanese nationality without reservation.  Since 
1950, children born in all ius soli countries (Article 9 of the Citizenship Act), and since 1985, 
                                                        
28 Those who are denied the diplomatic protection or assistance of their country of citizenship. 
29 Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, 27 January 1995, 49:1 Minshu 56. An English translation is available at JAIL 
40 (1997), 129. See Okuda (2003) and Steele (2004). 
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children born in all foreign countries (Article 12) have retroactively lost Japanese citizenship 
to the time of birth unless they expressed the intention to retain it.  Prior to WWII, the ‘system 
of reservation’ was established for the sake of protecting emigrant children’s human rights, 
but after WWII it became a hurdle for children who want to live and work in Japan (see below 
subsection 3). 
 
4.2. Involuntary Deprivation 
 
Japan colonised Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910. After World War II Japan was forced to 
give up its colonies, and the majority of people who had been brought to the Japanese islands 
from these colonies returned to their countries of origin. However, a large number of Koreans 
and a small number of Taiwanese remained in Japan. In 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
took effect and pursuant to the 1952 Circular of the Ministry of Justice, Korean and 
Taiwanese residents lost Japanese citizenship without their consent.30 Since 1965, with the 
normalisation of relations between Japan and South Korea, only old-comers registered as 
South Koreans were granted permanent resident status; old-comers registered as Korean (that 
is, those pro-North Korea and those not willing to declare an affiliation) were denied this 
status. Since 1992, Special Permanent Resident31 status has been granted to all old-comers. 
Even now more than 348,000 of their descendants are foreign residents with special residence 
permission. Japan mistakenly expected them either to return to their countries of origin or to 
naturalise through the relevant procedures, which required them to take Japanese names until 
1985. Because of the legacy of this policy, Japan is currently the only advanced democracy 
with a fourth-generation immigrant problem (Chung: 2010, 3).  
The Supreme Court decided that Japanese women married to Korean men and entered 
in a Korean family register lost their Japanese citizenship after the 1952 San Francisco Peace 
Treaty. 32  Also, the Supreme Court rejected the request for confirmation of Japanese 
citizenship from a Korean special permanent resident born in Japan of Korean parents who 
had lost his Japanese citizenship after the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty.33 Furthermore, 
the Tokyo District Court and Tokyo High Court rejected the request to revoke the 
naturalisation rejection of a Korean son and mother married with a Japanese man because the 
Minister of Justice had wide discretion for granting permission for naturalisation; attending a 
(pro-North) Korean school could be considered as a negative factor, even for special 
permanent residents.34 
                                                        
30 Circular No. 438 of the Director of the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice Concerning 
Nationality and Family Registration of Koreans, Taiwanese and Other Alien Residents after the Peace Treaty (19 
April 1952).  See Iwasawa, (1998), 144. The Japanese government, and especially the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, changed its original plan, which would have allowed former colonial subjects to choose their 
nationalities. This change is attributed to a perceived security threat (Kalicki et al.: 2013, 226). 
31 Under Article 22 of the Special Act on the Immigration Control of, Inter Alia, Those Who Have Lost Japanese 
Nationality Pursuant to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, special permanent residents are protected from 
deportation except when they are sentenced to imprisonment for more than seven years and the Minister of 
Justice finds that the vital interests of Japan are jeopardised by their crimes.  
32 Supreme Court, Grand Chamber, 5 April 1961, 62:6 Minshu 1367. An English translation is available at JAIL 
8 (1964), 153. 
33 Supreme Court, 2nd petty bench, 12 December 2014. (There is no official report). 
34 Tokyo District Court, 6 February 2015, Website (Courts in Japan); Tokyo High Court, 16 July 2015, Website 
(Courts in Japan). 
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The UN Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of 
States35 have special relevance for the case of decolonised Korean and Taiwanese residents in 
Japan. From the viewpoint of recent international law, loss of citizenship without consent in 
relation to the succession of a state should be regarded as arbitrary deprivation of citizenship. 
Some decolonised residents lack social rights such as pensions (Shin: 2012, 370-1). In my 
view, the deprivation of their Japanese citizenship was arbitrary based on discrimination of 
national origin. The Secretary General of the United Nations submitted a report on ‘human 
rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality’ to the Human Rights Council on 14 December 
2009. The notion of arbitrariness could be interpreted to include not only acts that are against 
the law but, more broadly, elements of inappropriateness, injustice and lack of predictability 
also (Secretary General of the United Nations: 2009, para. 25). Therefore, the prevention of 
arbitrary deprivation of citizenship includes some guiding principles, namely: the 
consequences of a deprivation-decision must be proportional; the administrative practice 
based on loss or deprivation provisions may not be discriminatory; and a legal provision 
regarding loss or allowing deprivation of nationality may not be enacted with retroactivity (de 
Groot and Vink: 2014, 4-5).  
             Article 15(2) of the UDHR states that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his or 
her nationality nor denied the right to change his or her nationality’. The principle of 
prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality has not been paid attention to in Japan but 
Article 15(2) was referred to in the interpretation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution, 
providing for the freedom to divest citizenship. According to the dominant opinion of 
constitutional lawyers, there is no freedom to be stateless because ‘divest’ should be 
interpreted as ‘change’ as stipulated in the UDHR.  
 
4.3. The ‘System of Reservation’ 
 
Under Article 13 of the Citizenship Act, Japanese citizens having foreign citizenship may 
renounce their Japanese citizenship by notification to the Minister of Justice. A unique feature 
of Japanese citizenship is the ‘system of reservation’ for the sake of preventing automatic 
acquisition of Japanese citizenship by foreign-born children who have no real ties with Japan. 
Under Article 12 of the Citizenship Act, ‘a Japanese citizen who was born abroad and has 
acquired a foreign nationality by birth shall lose Japanese citizenship retroactively as from the 
time of birth, unless the Japanese citizen clearly indicates his or her volition to reserve 
Japanese citizenship’. This provision applies to births in any foreign country, not just ius soli 
countries (Article 9 of the former Nationality Act). Indeed, persons under 20 years of age who 
have lost Japanese citizenship under this system may reacquire Japanese citizenship by 
making a notification to the Minister of Justice if they have domicile in Japan. However, it is 
difficult for many foreign-born children who live with non-Japanese mothers abroad to have 
domicile in Japan because it is not sufficient for them to enter Japan as tourists or for family 
visits. They do not have adequate skills or financial resources to acquire domicile in Japan for 
the purpose of making a notification. The Supreme Court decided that this system did not 
contravene the equality protection clause because it prevented Japanese citizenship from 
losing substance and limited the occurrence of multiple citizenship to the greatest possible 
                                                        
35 UN General Assembly resolution 55/153 (2000), Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the 
Succession of States, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/55/153 (accessed on 10 
February 2016). 
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extent.36 In my view, the avoidance of multiple citizenship is not a reasonable ground. The 
‘system of reservation’ comprises a case of arbitrary deprivation of citizenship.        
 
4.4. Multiple Citizenship 
 
A UN convention on the elimination of multiple citizenship does not exist. The preamble of 
the 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws 
stipulates the principle of ‘one nationality only’, but it lacks binding legal authority. Recent 
international Conventions such as the 1997 European Convention on Nationality (ECN) stand 
neutral on the issue of multiple citizenship (Article 15), and leave the decision open to 
signatory nations (Council of Europe: 1997, para. 97). Additionally, Article 14 ECN protects 
multiple citizenship status acquired through marriage or birth right, and it also limits the 
forfeiture of citizenship by listing specific exceptions in Article 7. These provisions offer 
concrete examples of what constitutes the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality as 
set forth in Article 4c ECN and Article 15(2) UDHR. Coercing children of cross-national 
marriages to choose their citizenship after reaching adulthood and foreign-born children to 
indicate an intention to reserve their Japanese citizenship immediately after birth, by contrast, 
contradicts modern principles of international law. As a means of promoting pacifism, 
democracy, human rights protection, and international transactions, views accepting multiple 
citizenship are increasing (Martin: 2003, 5). The end of the Cold War, the abolishment of 
conscription systems, the surge of migration and cross-national marriages, and changes in 
international law can be mentioned as factors contributing to the rise of multiple citizenship in 
recent years.  
Unfortunately, the Cold War sentiment still lingers on in East Asia. In addition, three 
factors contribute to Japan’s aversion to dual citizenship: (i) the past experience of an 
American-Japanese being charged with treason;37 (ii) a relatively homogeneous society; and 
(iii) the Japanese sense of loyalty (Murazumi: 2000, 425-8). In order to avoid dual citizenship, 
Japan’s Citizenship Act has devised the peculiar systems of the ‘option’ and the ‘reservation’. 
However, these systems are contrary to the principle of non-discrimination. Furthermore, 
Koreans and Taiwanese who remained in Japan after WWII should have been given the 
option of retaining their Japanese citizenship.38 In the case of special permanent residents who 
lost Japanese citizenship without their consent, Japan’s actions can only be qualified as a form 
of arbitrary deprivation of citizenship.  
             Taro Kono, a Lower House member of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 
larger of the two-party ruling coalition, explained that there are 600,000 to 700,000 Japanese 
who are 22 years or older with two nationalities, if not more (Matsutani: 2009, 4)39. In other 
words, fewer than 10 percent of the Japanese with more than one nationality decide to retain 
                                                        
36 Supreme Court, 3rd petty bench, 10 March 2015, 69:2 Minshu 265. An English translation is available at: 
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1348 (accessed 30 September 2016). 
37 Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952). Mr. Kawakita was born in the US from Japanese parents. He 
had dual citizenship and stayed in Japan during WWII. After returning to the US, he was arrested and charged 
with treason for having mistreated American prisoners of war. The Supreme Court sentenced him to death, but 
the US President eventually pardoned him and deported him to Japan. Since then there has been no similar case 
as Kawakita. 
38 This option is in accordance with present international human rights law such as the 2000 United Nations’ 
Declaration of Articles on Nationality of natural persons in relation to the succession of States. 
39 Seiichi Fusamura, an official at the Ministry of Justice, estimated that about 400,000 persons became dual 
citizens between 1985 to 2002. Statement made in the Diet on 17 November 2004. 
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their Japanese nationality by the time they turn 22 years of age.40 He said that ‘the current 
system puts honest people and those who appear in the media at a disadvantage’ and in 2008 
submitted a proposal to an LDP panel he headed calling for the Citizenship Act to be revised 
to allow Japanese to hold other nationalities (Matsutani: 2009, 4). However, the proposal to 
allow multiple nationalities was not submitted to the Diet. The LDP lost the elections in 2009. 
According to Seiichi Fusamura, an official at the Ministry of Justice, dual citizenship is 
associated with lack of loyalty to the state, the collision of diplomatic protection and 
bigamy.41 However, he added that ‘we could not find concrete cases of such problems’. 
Currently, Japan has a rapidly ageing and decreasing population and Japan should therefore 
be regarded as a potential immigration country (Kondo: 2015, 155). In the near future, the 
Government should examine the introduction of the ius soli system (or, at least, the ius soli 
system for children born to permanent residents) or the ius domicilii system for the second 
generation children born to foreign parents in Japan, allowing these children to acquire 
citizenship after having resided a number of years in Japan after birth, and it should recognise 
multiple citizenship.  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
 
Traditionally, the principle of sovereignty affirms that each state shall determine under its 
own law who are its nationals. At the same time, this law shall only be accepted as far as it is 
consistent with international treaties, customary international law and constitutional law and, 
due to the development in the field of human rights law. Consequently, the state’s discretion 
with respect to the Citizenship Act is at present narrower than before. At this moment in time, 
the principles that statelessness should be avoided and that arbitrary deprivation of citizenship 
is prohibited are considered to be customary international law (Hailbronner: 2006, 65, 70). In 
addition, the principle of non-discrimination is a significant motive for reforming Citizenship 
Act.  
             The Constitution of the Empire of Japan did not stipulate gender equality. Whilst the 
present Constitution does have a gender equality clause, the courts initially confirmed the 
constitutionality of the principle of ius sanguinis a patre for the sake of avoiding dual 
citizenship. Eventually in 1984 before ratifying CEDAW, the Diet amended the clause to 
conform to the principle of ius sanguinis a matre et patre. After ratifying the ICCPR in 1979 
and the CRC in 1994, the government did not show any initiative  to amend the Citizenship 
Act, but in 2008 the Supreme Court at last decided that the discrimination between legitimate 
and illegitimate children acknowledged by Japanese father was unconstitutional. However, 
discriminative treatment in respect of former colonial subjects who were deprived of Japanese 
citizenship without their consent in 1952 still remains. For a long time the acquisition of 
                                                        
40 According to Taro Kono’s blog of 21 June 2007, the sample survey conducted by the Ministry of Justice 
showed that 20 percent of Japanese nationals under the age of 22 have decided on which citizenship they wished 
to retain. According to  government’s reply to MP Nobuto Hosaka of 11 December 2007, 49 out of 245 
respondents made such a decision. Itsuro Terada, an official from the Ministry of Justice explained that 440,000 
persons had selected citizenship between 1985 and 2003 and that 220,000 of them had opted for Japanese 
citizenship, thereby renouncing or losing their foreign citizenship (statement made in the Diet on 18 March 
2005). That explains the 10 percent, because half of the 20 per cent chose to give up their Japanese citizenship. 
41 Seiichi Fusamura in an answer to the Diet on 17 November 2004.  
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Japanese citizenship suffered from discriminative practices and deprivation of citizenship was 
conducted arbitrarily. Over time international human rights laws had some positive influence 
on the abolishment of discriminatory legislation regarding the acquisition of citizenship,  but 
they had no influence on the practice of arbitrary and discriminatory deprivation of Japanese 
citizenship.  In order to avoid dual citizenship, the Citizenship Act keeps the unique systems 
of the ‘option’ and the ‘reservation’. Such ‘deprivation’, ‘option’ and ‘reservation’ need to be 
reconsidered from the perspective of the principle of the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation 
of citizenship under Article 22(1) of the Constitution – stating that ‘freedom of all persons … 
to divest themselves of their nationality shall be inviolate’ – in conjunction with Article 15(2) 
UDHR.  
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